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Abstract 
Some children with Down syndrome may experience difficulties in recognising facial 
emotions, particularly fear, but it is not clear why, nor how such skills can best be facilitated. 
Using a photo-matching task, emotion recognition was tested in children with Down 
syndrome, children with non-specific intellectual disabilities and cognitively-matched 
typically-developing children (all groups N = 21) under four conditions: veridical vs 
exaggerated emotions and emotion-labelling vs generic task instructions. In all groups, 
exaggerating emotions facilitated recognition accuracy and speed, with emotion labelling 
facilitating recognition accuracy. Overall accuracy and speed did not differ in the children 
with Down syndrome, although recognition of fear was poorer than in the typically 
developing children and unrelated to emotion label use. Implications for interventions are 
considered. 
 
 
Keywords: Down syndrome, emotion recognition, emotion labelling. 
 
Abbreviations: BPVS: British Picture Vocabulary Scale; CA: chronological age; MA: mental 
age; PMA: performance mental age; VMA: verbal mental age; WISC: Wechsler Intelligence 
Scales for Children; WPPSI-R: Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scales of Intelligence, 
revised. 
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Emotion Recognition in Children with Down Syndrome: Influence of Emotion Label and 
Expression Intensity  
 Within intellectual disability research, emotion recognition is an area that has received 
much attention. This is perhaps unsurprising, as it is a core skill in social interaction, long 
recognised as underpinning many other areas of learning (e.g. Rogoff, 1990). Much of this 
work has focused on autism spectrum conditions, but in recent years emotion recognition 
research has been informed by a behavioural phenotype approach, exploring and contrasting 
patterns of strengths and difficulties across a range of specific aetiologies (e.g. Porter, 
Coltheart & Langdon, 2007; Whittington & Holland, 2011). Such an approach, if combined 
with a developmental perspective, has the potential to inform the design of early and 
specifically targeted interventions (Fidler & Nadel, 2007). Yet in order to maximise 
intervention utility it is important to establish precisely which aspects of emotion recognition 
present difficulties for children with specific aetiologies, and which specific techniques will 
best facilitate emotion recognition. The present study explored these issues in relation to 
children with Down syndrome. 
 A number of studies conducted to date have shown that children and adults with 
Down syndrome are significantly less proficient in the understanding of emotions than would 
be expected on the basis of chronological age, and have also indicated difficulties in 
comparison to typically developing individuals of similar developmental levels (Hippolyte, 
Barisnikov, Van der Linden & Detraux, 2009; Kasari, Freeman & Hughes, 2001; Pochon & 
Declercq, 2014; Virji-Babul, Watt, Nathoo & Johnson, 2012; Way & Rojahn, 2012; 
Williams, Wishart, Pitcairn & Willis, 2005; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000, but see Celani, 
Battacchi & Arcidiacono, 1999; Channell, Conners & Barth, 2014; Pochon & Declercq, 2013 
for exceptions). A number of these studies explored six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, 
anger, surprise, fear, disgust), and several reported difficulties in relation to specific 
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expressions, often that of fear (Kasari et al., 2001; Virji-Babul et al., 2012; Williams et al., 
2005; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000); error patterns with respect to fear recognition were also 
found to be developmentally atypical (Williams et al., 2005). Fear recognition difficulties 
have not always been found in all emotional understanding tasks, nor have they always been 
shown to be syndrome-specific (see Cebula & Wishart, 2008 for review). Difficulties with 
other emotions have also been reported, albeit less consistently (e.g. Wishart & Pitcairn, 
2000; Kasari, et al., 2001). Taken together though, the findings of these studies do suggest 
that emotion recognition in general, and fear recognition in particular, may be an area of 
concern with some children with Down syndrome.  
A variety of methods have already been developed to support children with 
developmental disabilities in their understanding of emotions (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Golan, 
Wheelwright & Hill, 2004; Golan et al., 2010). However, children with Down syndrome may 
show a different profile of emotional understanding skills from that found in other 
developmental disabilities (e.g. Celani et al., 1999), and there may also be differences in the 
origin of any difficulties. To develop targeted interventions, it is therefore important to 
establish in more detail which specific components of emotion recognition are problematic 
for children with Down syndrome. 
One difficulty here is that emotion recognition tasks tend to conflate semantic 
knowledge of emotion labels with perceptual face processing ability (Lindquist & Gendron, 
2013; Vicari, Reilly, Pasqualetti, Vizzotto & Caltagirone, 2000), often using emotion labels 
in verbal task instructions (happy, sad, etc.), in combination with facial expressions of 
emotion (e.g. photographs, schematic drawings). As a result it is sometimes unclear whether 
the verbal emotion labels, the facial stimuli, or both are problematic for study participants. 
Language plays a central role in the understanding of emotions (Lindquist & 
Gendron, 2013; Reed & Steed, 2015), and in typical development emotion labels are used 
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from early childhood (Lindquist & Gendron, 2013; Ridgeway, Waters & Kuczaj, 1985). 
Some labels, such as happy, sad and angry are used accurately earlier than others, such as 
fear and disgust (Székely et al., 2011; Vicari et al., 2000; Widen & Russell, 2003), but 
accurate use of emotion labels continues to develop throughout the school years (Widen & 
Russell, 2008; Vicari et al., 2000).  
It is possible that the emotion recognition difficulty found in children with Down 
syndrome relates specifically to difficulties with the emotion labels used in tasks. Indeed, 
there is some recent evidence of this: in comparison to younger MA-matched typically 
developing children, Pochon and Declerq (2013, 2014) have reported difficulties amongst 
children with Down syndrome in an emotion recognition task employing emotion labels, but 
no significant difficulties in an emotion vocalisation-to-face matching task which did not use 
emotion labels. They concluded that children with Down syndrome may have a specific 
emotional lexicon deficit, rather than a difficulty in recognising emotional expressions per se, 
although it is unclear whether this was the case across all of the emotions they studied. Such a 
difficulty would, though, fit with evidence noted by Kasari et al. (2001) that children with 
Down syndrome are exposed to less conversation about emotional terminology than are 
typically developing children (Tingley, Gleason, & Hooshyar, 1994); in particular, Kasari et 
al. suggested that, because young children with Down syndrome are often perceived to be of 
a friendly and happy disposition, caregivers may use fewer negative emotion words with 
them, providing children with fewer opportunities to learn these particular emotion labels. 
Rather than difficulties with linguistic emotion labels, distinguishing and decoding the 
facial emotion stimuli themselves may be problematic for individuals with Down syndrome. 
This possibility is supported by the finding that emotion recognition difficulties have been 
reported even in tasks that have been designed to minimise language demands (e.g. Williams 
et al., 2005). It is also supported by findings of differences in the emotional expressions 
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experienced in interactions between parents and their children with Down syndrome from 
early in life (e.g. Carvajal & Iglesias, 1997). 
One way in which the influence of the facial emotions themselves can be explored is 
to manipulate the intensity of expressions in tasks, and assess whether recognition improves 
with increased intensity. Most of the studies to date that have explored the effects of emotion 
intensity on facial expression recognition have been with typically developing participants 
(Calder, Young, Rowland & Perrett, 1997; Gao & Maurer, 2009; Herba, Landau, Russell, 
Ecker & Phillips., 2006). These have often used computer-manipulated facial expressions of 
emotion and results generally show that more intense or exaggerated facial expressions of 
emotion are recognised more quickly, and with equivalent or increased accuracy, than less 
intense expressions. However, the size of this effect can vary with emotion (Herba et al, 
2006). Exaggerated emotions might result in more accurate recognition because fine detail is 
more easily detected (Calder et al., 1997; Guo & Maurer, 2009), and may attract greater 
attentional resources (Kumfor et al., 2011). Increased intensity of emotion has also been 
shown to lead to increased neural response. For example, Morris et al. (1996, 1998) found 
that increased intensity of fearful expressions led to heightened amygdala response in 
typically developing participants. Although there has been some work with atypical child 
populations using computer manipulated facial emotion stimuli (e.g. Blair, Colledge, Murray 
& Mitchell, 2001; Castelli, 2005), the effects of intensity manipulation have not previously 
been examined in children with Down syndrome. 
These two components of emotion recognition - perceptual (facial expression 
recognition) and linguistic (emotion label understanding) - may be closely related, but follow 
very different developmental pathways (Vicari et al., 2000). While it is unlikely to be 
possible to disentangle them completely, a better understanding of how these two elements 
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contribute towards any difficulties experienced by children with Down syndrome might begin 
to pave the way for the development of targeted interventions. 
The present study explored emotion recognition in children with Down syndrome, in 
comparison to children with non-specific intellectual disabilities and typically developing 
children matched for developmental age. It aimed to establish:  
- the extent to which exaggeration of facial expressions and the use of emotion labels 
effect emotion recognition accuracy and speed 
- whether any differences exist across groups in ability to recognise specific emotions 
and, if so, whether these difficulties are predominantly perceptual or linguistic.  
It was hypothesised that exaggerated emotions and emotion labels would improve the overall 
accuracy and speed of emotion recognition in all three groups of children, but not necessarily 
equally. In line with previous research it was hypothesised that children with Down syndrome 
would experience particular difficulties in fear recognition, although the literature to date 
does not allow for a clear prediction on whether such a difficulty would be predominantly 
perceptual or linguistic. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-one children participated in the study: 28 with Down syndrome (10 male, 18 
female; 9;03 – 18;09 years), 25 with non-specific intellectual disabilities (11 male, 14 female; 
9;01 – 17;05 years) and 28 typically developing children ( 14 male, 14 female; 3;04 – 6;06 
years). Children participated from 6 mainstream schools, 4 special schools and 1 mainstream 
nursery. The majority of children with intellectual disabilities were in special school 
placements, reflecting educational placement patterns in the region in which the study was 
carried out.  
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Parents were sent letters about the study and consent forms. These went to families 
already on a database of voluntary study participants held by the research team, and also via 
local mainstream and special schools where the head teachers identified pupils who met the 
inclusion criteria. Response rates were high, but because researchers were not always 
informed of the number of letters sent by the school, precise response rates cannot be 
reported. 
Diagnosis of the children in the Down syndrome and non-specific intellectual disability 
groups was confirmed by cross-checking local educational and central health records. The 
non-specific intellectual disability group was composed of children for whom etiology of 
intellectual disabilities was unknown. Children with identified genetic syndromes, a family 
history of intellectual disabilities or with known neurological insult were excluded. In 
addition, children were excluded from all three participant groups if they had attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, severe sensory or physical impairment, severe behavioral difficulties, 
or were on the autism spectrum. In the case of the two intellectual disability groups an 
additional exclusion criterion was profound or complex intellectual disabilities as task 
demands were likely to be beyond the capabilities of these children.  
 
Design and Procedure 
Assessment measures. Cognitive ability was assessed using a four-subtest short-form 
of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scales of Intelligence-Revised (WPPSI-R: Wechsler, 
1990). This short-form consisted of two subtests from the original performance and verbal 
scales and has shown high reliability coefficients and high validity in terms of correlation 
with full test scores (rtt = .932, r = .914: Sattler, 1992). Vocabulary comprehension was 
measured using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II: Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & 
Burley, 1997). Children were also administered the Benton Facial Recognition Test (Benton, 
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Sivan, Hamsher, Varney & Spreen, 1983). This is a standardized procedure for assessing the 
ability to identify unfamiliar human faces. Participants are presented with a single black and 
white photograph of a face and then instructed to locate that face in a display of six 
photographs, where it appeared either one or three times. The 27-item short-form of this test 
was used on which a score of 11 might be expected on the basis of chance alone (Benton, 
Sivan, Hamsher, & Spreen, 1994).  
Emotion-matching task. This experimental task required participants to match 
photographs of unfamiliar adults on the basis of facial emotion. It used photographs from 
Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Affect Slides (1976), a series of 11.5 x 17.5 cm black and white 
photographs of men and women expressing the six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, 
surprise, fear and disgust) and a set of ‘neutral’ poses. These photographs have been used 
extensively in research with typical and atypical children and adults, and have high inter-rater 
agreement regarding the emotion displayed (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Children were shown 
one facial photograph, and were then asked to point to a photograph of a different person 
showing the same emotion from a choice of three photographs (the correct emotion and two 
distracters) that were then uncovered underneath. The photographs were all mounted on a 
single piece of cardboard. The photographs selected from the Ekman and Friesen series for 
this task consisted of one male and one female face displaying each of the six basic emotions. 
Where the male model was shown in the initial photograph to be matched, the female model 
was shown in the three choice photographs and vice versa. Position of correct answer was 
counterbalanced across trials. 
Two intensity levels of emotion were used in this task: ‘veridical’ and ‘exaggerated’. 
The ‘veridical’ trials used the Ekman and Friesen faces. The ‘exaggerated’ trials used photos 
taken from the Facial Expressions of Emotion – Stimuli and Tests series (FEEST: Young, 
Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer & Ekman, 2002). These were the same photographs as those 
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used for the ‘veridical’ trials, but digitally altered so that the emotional expressions appear 
exaggerated in comparison to the veridical Ekman and Friesen photographs. This digital 
alteration enhances the emotional intensity of the expression displayed (Calder et al., 2000). 
Various levels of exaggeration are available, but as this study was the first to utilise these 
images with children with Down syndrome, the largest degree of exaggeration (175%) was 
used to ensure that any effects were detectable. These exaggerated FEEST photographs are 
only available for one male and one female model from the Ekman and Friesen series. 
Therefore both the veridical and the exaggerated trials used photographs of only these 
models.  
Altogether there were 48 trials – presented as 24 within each of two test sessions. Each 
set of 24 trials consisted of 12 presented as ‘veridical emotions’ and 12 ‘exaggerated 
emotions’. In each set of 12 trials each of the six basic emotions was presented as the target 
twice. Exactly the same 24 trials were used in each of the two test sessions. However, in one 
test session generic task instructions were used (the children were shown the target photo and 
asked: “Who feels the same as this person?”). In the other test session emotion labelling task 
instructions were used (the children were shown the target photo and told: “This person feels 
(e.g.) happy. Who feels the same as this person?”). These sessions were presented in 
counterbalanced order, and for each child, trial order was identical in each session. There 
were therefore four conditions in total: veridical emotions with generic task instructions; 
exaggerated emotions with generic task instructions; veridical emotions with emotion 
labelling task instructions; exaggerated emotions with emotion labelling task instructions.  
In any trial all the photographs (i.e. the initial photograph and the three choice 
photographs) were either veridical or exaggerated. The emotions used in the distracter 
photographs were identical for each of the corresponding veridical and exaggerated trials, as 
was the position of the correct answer: the trials therefore only differed in one respect, the 
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intensity of the emotions depicted. The 24 ‘veridical’ and ‘exaggerated’ trials were presented 
in a fixed random order, with the constraints that: the first and last trials were the veridical 
happy expressions (in the case of the first trial, to ensure that the child could easily 
understand the task, and in the case of the last trial to ensure that they ended the session with 
a positive rather than negative emotion); the same emotion was never presented twice in a 
row; no more than two trials in a row depicted the same level of intensity (100 or 175%) or 
the same gender in the target photograph. The order of trials was therefore fixed, but half of 
the children in each group were presented with them in reverse order in case fatigue caused 
less accurate responding in later trials. 
At the beginning of each test session children were asked to place their hands on a 
horizontal red line on the table, and reminded to return their hands to this position at the 
beginning of each trial (this was so that response time could be measured as accurately as 
possible). To avoid confounding expressive language and memory difficulties with any 
emotion-specific deficits, children were required to indicate their answer only by pointing, 
and all four photographs remained on the table to ensure that emotion recognition rather than 
recognition memory was being tested. Children were presented with the task by one 
experimenter and responses recorded by another experimenter who sat unobtrusively in the 
corner of the room. As recommended by Herba and Phillips (2004) and De Sonneville et al. 
(2002) response speed data were collected in addition to accuracy data, and all sessions were 
filmed for later analysis of response times. 
Emotion label production. this task was presented around one week after the final 
emotion-matching task session, and it again used photographs from the Ekman and Friesen 
series. Children were shown a photograph from this series of a woman showing a neutral 
expression and told “This is Mary”. They were then shown a photograph of the same woman 
with a happy expression and asked “And now she feels…?” The children were then shown 
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photographs of the same woman displaying sadness, anger, surprise, fear and disgust, in a 
random order, and for each one, the same question repeated. There was one stimuli photo per 
emotion. This was a free-choice response task: no list of possible responses was provided. If 
children did not provide a response a prompt, ‘Mary feels…?’ was provided. Children’s 
responses were noted, but incorrect responses were not corrected. The model chosen from the 
Ekman series was the one which Ekman and Friesen’s data showed to have produced the 
highest average level of viewer agreement on the intended emotions, with agreement level for 
any single emotion not less than 88%. 
Matching procedures. Following previous studies in this field, groups were matched 
on the basis of MA. From the original participant pool of 81, it was possible to MA-match 21 
children from each participant group on the basis of their Wechsler scores. Each child from 
the non-specific intellectual disability and the typically developing groups was individually 
pair-wise matched as closely as possible to a child from the Down syndrome group (with no 
MA difference between individual children greater than 10 months and across all individually 
paired children a mean difference in MA of 4.3 months). Table 1 gives a summary of 
characteristics in the three groups. Mean MA (a composite of performance mental age (PMA) 
and verbal mental age (VMA)) did not significantly differ across groups (around 4 years in 
all groups) and ranges were also similar. There were also no significant group differences in 
PMA, VMA, vocabulary comprehension or gender balance. There were significant 
differences in Benton scores and chronological age. Although there were no differences 
between the two intellectual disability groups in terms of Benton scores, the non-specific 
intellectual disability group did obtain significantly higher scores than the typically 
developing group (Posthoc Scheffe p < .05). In addition, the Down syndrome and non-
specific intellectual disability group did not differ in chronological age but, as would be 
expected, both groups were significantly older than the developmentally matched typically 
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developing group (Posthoc Scheffe p < .001). The age range in the typically developing 
group was also much smaller than in the other two groups. 
 
- Table 1 about here – 
Procedure. Ethical consent was obtained from the lead author’s University ethics 
committee, and participants were only included once school and parental permission had 
been granted. Parents were provided with an information sheet and consent form, and were 
also asked to explain the study to their child, using child-friendly information and consent 
sheets where they judged these to be appropriate. Child assent was reconfirmed at each 
testing session, either verbally or using pictorial methods. Children were tested in a quiet 
room in their school, over a number of sessions. Length and number of sessions varied, 
depending on the child’s availability and levels of fatigue, but children received some 
standardised and some experimental tasks in each session. The two photo-matching task 
sessions were always given at least one week apart. 
Analysis. Accuracy data was manually recorded for each of the experimental tasks. In 
addition, response time for each emotion-matching trial was measured from the film clips of 
test sessions using the Observer Video-Pro, a software package which allows frame-by-frame 
analysis of events, and hence a high level of accuracy in data analysis (Noldus, Trienes, 
Hendriksen, Jansen, & Jansen, 2000). Coding of response time was conducted by the first 
author. For each trial, timing of response began when the card covering the three choice 
photographs was removed and stopped when the child’s finger touched a photograph to 
indicate their answer. To assess inter-rater agreement of response time coding, twelve 
sessions from the full participant pool were re-coded by the third author. The mean kappa 
value was 0.95. The emotion production task was scored as follows: a score of one point was 
given for each emotion correctly identified (i.e. a maximum possible score of 6). The 
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following emotion terms were classed as correct: ‘happy’; ‘sad’; ‘angry’ or ‘cross’; 
‘surprised’; ‘fearful’ or ‘scared’; ‘disgusted’ or ‘yuck’. 
 
Results 
Emotion-matching Task 
This task required participants to match photographs of unfamiliar adults on the basis of 
facial expressions. Emotions were either veridical or exaggerated, and either labelled or non-
labelled. Within each participant group total accuracy scores and mean response times did not 
differ as a function of either participant gender or order of presentation of conditions. Data 
were therefore collapsed in these respects.  
Accuracy data. Table 2 shows the total accuracy scores for the three MA-matched 
groups, as well as these scores broken down according to condition. 
- Table 2 about here - 
Scores were analyzed using a 3 (participant group) x 2 (intensity condition) x 2 
(labelling condition) mixed model ANOVA. This showed significant main effects of group 
(F(2, 60) = 3.26, p < .05, η2p  = .10), of intensity (F(1, 60), = 9.48, p <.01, η2p  = .14) and of 
labelling (F(1, 60) = 18.79, p < .001, η2p  = .24), but no significant interaction effects amongst 
group, intensity and labelling.  
Post-hoc analysis of the group effect showed that the typically developing children 
were more accurate overall on this task than the two intellectual disability groups, but that 
this difference was only significant in relation to the children with non-specific intellectual 
disabilities (Scheffe test p < .05). In relation to emotion intensity, children were significantly 
more accurate overall in emotion recognition when the stimuli were of greater intensity. In 
relation to emotion labelling, children were significantly more accurate overall in emotion 
recognition when the emotions were labelled (see above).  
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Response time data. Table 3 shows the total mean response time data for the three 
MA-matched groups, as well as these scores broken down according to condition.  
- Table 3 about here - 
Scores were analyzed using a 3 (participant group) x 2 (intensity condition) x 2 
(labelling condition) mixed model ANOVA. This showed no significant main effect of group 
(F(2, 57) = 1.90, ns), nor of labelling (F(1, 57) = 0.36, ns), but a significant effect of intensity 
(F(1, 57), = 33.91, p < .001, η2p  = .37). There were no significant interaction effects. The 
groups did not therefore significantly differ from each other in how quickly they gave an 
answer. Nor did the use of emotion labelling facilitate or impede speed of performance. 
However, on the whole the children were significantly faster at recognizing the exaggerated 
emotions compared to the veridical ones. To control for the possibility that some children 
may have been sacrificing accuracy for speed, the analysis was rerun, including only the 
response times for trials in which the children had responded correctly. The pattern of 
significant and non-significant results was unchanged. 
Individual emotion accuracy data. Table 4 shows accuracy scores for the six 
individual emotions (conditions collapsed). To establish whether groups differed in their 
ability to recognize the six individual emotions, scores were analyzed using a 3 (participant 
group) x 6 (emotion) ANOVA. This showed significant main effects of group (F (2,60) = 
3.26 p < .05, η2p  = .10) and emotion (F (5, 300) = 44.85, p < .001, η2p  = .43) and a significant 
interaction between group and emotion (F (10, 300) = 2.89, p < .01, η2p  = .09). When 
individual emotions were analyzed it was found that the Down’s syndrome group were 
significantly less accurate than the typically developing group in the recognition of fear (F (2, 
60) = 4.02; p < .05, η2p  = .12; post-hoc Scheffe p < .05). In addition, the non-specific 
intellectual disability group were significantly less accurate than the typically developing 
group in the recognition of anger (F (2, 60) = 5.74 p < .01; post-hoc Scheffe p < .01).  
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- Table 4 about here -  
To explore the effect of increased intensity and emotion labelling on recognition of 
these two emotions they were analyzed individually. As the differences in fear recognition 
ability lay between the Down syndrome and typically developing groups further analysis 
focused only on these two groups. This showed that the Down syndrome group was less 
accurate in fear recognition than the typically developing group when emotion labelling was 
used: M(SD) = 2.05 (1.36) and 3.05 (1.16) for the Down syndrome and typically developing 
groups respectively, t(40) = -2.56, p < .05. They were also less accurate when emotion 
labelling was not used: M(SD) = 1.67 (1.20) and 2.57 (1.29) for the Down syndrome and  
typically developing groups respectively, t(40) = -2.36, p < .05. The Down syndrome group 
were less accurate in fear recognition than the typically developing group when the 
exaggerated images were used: M(SD) = 1.71 (1.23) and 2.86 (1.11) for the Down syndrome 
and typically developing groups respectively, t(40) = -3.16, p < .01. They were also less 
accurate with the veridical emotions, although the difference was non-significant: M(SD) = 
2.00 (1.38) and 2.76 (1.09) for the Down syndrome and typically developing groups 
respectively, t(40) = -1.99, p = .054. 
Fear recognition scores in the Down syndrome group were in fact not significantly 
different from what would be expected on the basis of chance responding alone (t(20) = 2.08, 
p = 0.051). In terms of facilitation of fear recognition, paired t-tests showed that the Down 
syndrome group showed no significant improvement in fear recognition performance if labels 
were used (t(20) = -1.56, NS). Similarly, they showed no significant improvement in 
performance when exaggerated emotions were used (t(20) = -1.06, NS). 
The difference in anger recognition between non-specific intellectual disability and 
typically developing groups was then explored. It was found that the non-specific intellectual 
disability group was less accurate than the typically developing group in anger recognition 
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when emotion labelling was used: M(SD) = 1.57 (1.17) and 2.81 (1.47) for the non-specific 
intellectual disability and  typically developing groups respectively, t(40) = -3.02, p < .01. 
They were also less accurate when emotion labelling was not used: M(SD) = 1.19 (1.17) and 
2.33 (1.46) for the non-specific intellectual disability and typically developing groups 
respectively, t(40) = -2.80, p < .01. The non-specific intellectual disability group were less 
accurate than the typically developing group when the exaggerated images were used: M(SD) 
= 1.62 (1.16) and 2.62 (1.43) for the non-specific intellectual disability and typically 
developing groups respectively, t(40) = -2.49, p < .05. They also performed less accurately 
when the emotion was veridical: M(SD) = 1.14 (1.11) and 2.52 (1.29) for the non-specific 
intellectual disability and typically developing groups respectively, t(40) = -3.72, p < .01. 
Again, anger recognition scores in the non-specific intellectual disability group were 
not significantly different from what would be expected on the basis of chance responding 
alone (t(20) = 0.21, NS). In terms of facilitation of anger recognition, paired t-tests showed 
that the non-specific intellectual disability group showed no significant improvement in anger 
recognition performance if labels were used (t(20) = -1.40, NS). Similarly, they showed no 
significant improvement in performance when exaggerated emotions were used (t(20) = -
1.94, NS). 
Emotion Label Production Task 
In this task children were asked to label each of the six emotions from photographs. 
The mean number of emotions correctly labeled were 3.45 (1.10), 2.95 (1.12) and 3.62 (1.07) 
for the Down syndrome, non-specific intellectual disability and typically developing groups 
respectively. Scores from this task were analyzed using a 3 (participant group) x 6 (emotion) 
mixed model ANOVA. This showed no significant main effect of participant group (F (2,60) 
= 2.09, ns), a significant effect of emotion (F (5, 300) = 63.12, p < .001 η2p  = .51) and no 
significant interaction (F (10, 300) = 0.32, ns). The groups did not therefore differ in their 
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overall ability to label the emotions, although some emotions were significantly more likely 
to be labelled correctly (happy was easier than all other emotions; sad was easier than all 
other emotions except for happy and angry; angry was easier than surprise, fear and disgust: p 
≤ .001 in all cases).  
Relationships between assessment measures and experimental task performance 
A series of correlations were carried out within each of the MA-matched groups using 
all available child data (Table 5). This showed that emotion-matching accuracy scores 
correlated significantly with mental age, verbal mental age and vocabulary comprehension 
levels in all three participant groups. A correlation between accuracy scores and 
chronological age was unique to the typically developing group. Accuracy scores correlated 
with performance mental age and with Benton test scores in the non-specific intellectual 
disability and Down syndrome groups. Emotion-matching accuracy scores did not correlate 
with emotion label production in any of the three groups. 
- Table 5 about here – 
 
Discussion 
The present study explored the effect of exaggerated facial emotions and of emotion 
labelling on the speed and accuracy of emotion recognition in children with Down syndrome, 
children with non-specific intellectual disability, and typically developing children matched 
on cognitive ability. Across the participant groups as a whole, the children were more 
accurate in the recognition of emotions when they were more intense and when they were 
labelled, supporting previous findings with typically developing children (e.g. Herba et al., 
2006; Russell & Widen, 2002). Children overall also recognized exaggerated emotional 
expressions more quickly, although the addition of emotion labels did not increase their speed 
of recognition.  
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The children with Down syndrome did not differ significantly from the other groups in 
their ability to label basic emotions, or in their speed and accuracy of emotion matching 
overall. However, in relation to specific emotions, they were significantly less accurate than 
the typically developing children in the recognition of fear. Accuracy scores of children with 
Down syndrome for fear were not significantly different from chance. These fear recognition 
difficulties were not obviously linguistic in nature, as they were still evident when emotion 
labels were absent from task instructions. Recognition of fear was facilitated neither by the 
use of emotion labels nor by the use of exaggerated expressions.  
Children with non-specific intellectual disability were significantly less accurate than 
the typically developing children in emotion recognition in general, though in contrast, 
significantly more accurate in the Benton face recognition task. This latter finding perhaps 
points to the role of experience in face recognition (though for recent discussion see McKone, 
Crookes, Jeffery & Dilks, 2012). Specifically, within emotion recognition they were 
significantly less accurate in the recognition of anger, again with recognition abilities not 
significantly different from chance. Indeed, participants across all groups found anger 
difficult to recognize. This may have been because the target and response anger stimuli were 
more dissimilar than in the case of the other emotions (a closed and an open-mouth 
expression of anger). In all three groups emotion recognition accuracy was correlated with 
mental age and vocabulary comprehension, but not with emotion labelling ability. 
Other research studies have found greater evidence of difficulties in emotional 
understanding in Down syndrome (e.g. Kasari et al., 2001; Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et 
al., 2007). The finding here that emotion recognition in general was not an area of difficulty 
beyond what would be expected given their mental age, is very encouraging. Indeed, it was 
notable that the performance of the Down syndrome and the typically developing groups in 
this study were, overall, marked more by similarity than difference. This pattern of findings is 
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in concordance with findings from some previous studies (e.g. Channell et al., 2014; Pochon 
& Declerq, 2013). The reasons for the discrepancy in findings across different studies are 
unclear, but may relate to differences in participants, stimuli or tasks (Channell et al., 2014). 
For example, participants in the present study had higher mean language ability than those in 
previous studies with contrasting findings (though different language measures across studies 
makes comparison difficult), and the present study used different tasks and stimuli than in 
some previous studies (e.g. Kasari et al., 2001 used a puppet paradigm). 
In relation to the current study it must be borne in mind that the three participant groups 
were matched on cognitive ability. Given that overall emotion matching scores were not yet 
at ceiling in the much younger typically developing children, differences in emotion 
recognition abilities might have been found had the children with Down syndrome been 
compared with peers of similar chronological age. As many children with Down syndrome 
now attend mainstream school, additional support in emotion recognition may therefore be 
required to facilitate social interaction with peers in their own age group. The results of the 
present study suggest that labelling emotions and using exaggerated emotional expressions 
may be helpful here, at least for some emotions. 
Although emotion recognition in general was not found to be any more difficult for the 
children with Down syndrome than the two comparison groups, they were significantly less 
accurate than the typically developing children in the recognition of fearful expressions. This 
significant difference was found in three of the four conditions (labelled; non-labelled; 
exaggerated) and it approached significance in the fourth (veridical). This specific weakness 
in fear recognition ties in with findings from a number of previous studies (Kasari et al., 
2001; Williams et al., 2005; Wishart & Pitcairn, 2000). However, it is worth noting that a 
difficulty in fear recognition was found only in comparison to the typically developing group, 
not in comparison to the non-specific intellectual disability group, suggesting that this 
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difficulty may not be strongly syndrome-specific (see also Turk & Cornish, 1998; Wishart et 
al., 2007). A larger scale study would be helpful in confirming this. 
 The fear recognition difficulty did not seem to stem from any linguistic problems in 
understanding and using the emotion label ‘scared’: participant groups did not differ 
signficiantly on verbal comprehension ability or in their ability to label a photograph of a 
fearful face. The children with Down syndrome moreover remained significantly less 
accurate than the typically developing children even in the condition in which instructions 
included no emotion label. This pattern of findings appears to contradict those of Pochon and 
Declercq (2013, 2014), who reported that the emotion recognition difficulties found in 
children with Down syndrome stem primarily from problems with emotion labels, rather than 
from a difficulty in recognizing facial expressions per se. However, emotion labels are more 
important in the recognition of some emotions than others (Widen & Russell, 2004) and it is 
possible that this apparent contradiction in findings stems from a difference between our own 
study and that of Pochon and Declerq in the extent to which analysis was conducted at the 
level of individual emotions. One further complication is that even in the absence of its use 
by the experimenter, children may use emotion labelling internally to assist them with 
emotion recognition tasks. This too would be worth investigating more fully in the future, 
given that self-produced labelling has been shown to enhance emotion perception in typical 
development (Lindquist et al., 2006). 
The continuing difficulty in fear recognition, regardless of the presence or absence of a 
linguistic label, suggests that some children with Down syndrome have a perceptual difficulty 
in interpreting this specific facial expression. This may in turn relate to more basic face 
processing difficulties amongst this group. Vicari et al. (2000), for example, have noted that 
recognition of emotions such as fear and anger require the processing of both the upper and 
the lower parts of the face, while research by Carvajal, Ferández-Alcaraz, Rueda, & Sarrión 
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(2012) has shown that adults with Down syndrome may focus on the lower more than the 
upper half of the face when processing emotional expressions. However, the extent to which 
such findings, in the absence of significant parallel difficulties with anger, can explain fear 
recognition difficulties in Down syndrome is unclear.  
In typical development, a developmental exploration of fear recognition at a 
neurological level has been shown to be informative (e.g. Guyer et al., 2008), with fear 
recognition linked to the amygdala (for review and a contrasting neural model of emotion 
recognition see Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012). While this merits 
closer consideration in Down syndrome, it is worth noting that although some studies have 
reported reduced amygdala volume in Down syndrome, this does not always remain after 
adjustment for overall brain volume, and in adults is complicated by the possible presence of 
Alzheimer’s dementia (Aylward et al., 1999; Constable et al., 2010; Krasuki et al., 2002; 
White et al., 2003 – for a recent developmental neurological overview see Karmiloff-Smith et 
al., 2016). Further exploration of environmental influences on the development of fear 
recognition skills in Down syndrome should also be explored, for example investigating the 
role of the children’s own experiences of displaying and observing this emotion. Bringing 
these various ‘layers’ of developmental pathways together in a causal model of socio-
cognitive development might well prove informative in the future (see Cebula, Moore & 
Wishart, 2010; Moore & George, 2014). 
As important as establishing the cause of fear recognition difficulties identified in 
laboratory-based studies is the need to establish whether this difficulty is observed in the 
everyday lives of children with Down syndrome and, if so, whether this influences their 
behavior or social interactions. Even if fear is difficult for some children with Down 
syndrome to recognize, it may be that this does not affect day-to-day interactions in any 
substantive way. This is not to suggest that recognition of fearful expressions is unimportant 
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(see e.g. Thurman & Mervis, 2013; Knieps, Walden & Baxter, 1994), but rather that if 
interventions to better support adaptive social functioning are to be identified, there is a need 
to understand more fully the impact of emotion recognition ability on the social experiences 
of individuals with intellectual disabilities (Zaja & Rojahn, 2008). 
Although findings from the specific paradigm used here must be generalized with 
caution, they do suggest that in the early stages of any intervention to support the 
development of emotion recognition skills, it might be worth exploring whether individual 
children with Down syndrome do require particular support with recognition of fearful 
expressions. It may also be worth considering the use of exaggerated expressions (either in 
depicted or real life contexts) to help underpin identification of more subtle and complex 
emotions at a later stage in development. Whilst there is little direct evidence in the literature 
to support the use of exaggerated over veridical emotions in the learning of emotional 
expressions, there is some indirect support for this in studies of how caregivers interact with 
their infants in the early stages of learning about emotions. Caregivers typically exaggerate 
their facial expressions when interacting with infants (e.g. Stern, 1974), and in relation to 
positive emotions such as smiling, more intense expressions better capture the attention of 
infants (Kuchuk, Vibbert, & Bornstein, 1986). The use of cartoon/schematic emotions (which 
often accentuate the key features of expressions) is also already established in emotion 
recognition interventions for children with developmental disabilities (e.g. Silver and Oakes, 
2001), suggesting that such approaches might merit evaluation with children with Down 
syndrome, including attention to how progress is made in recognizing more subtly-expressed 
emotion in everyday social situations. The findings from this study also suggest that the use 
of emotion labels might be similarly helpful in supporting emotion recognition. Research 
with typically developing children, however, suggests that exploring the embedding of these 
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labels in causal conversational contexts may be particularly productive in supporting the 
development of emotional understanding (Brown & Dunn, 1996; see Salmon et al., 2013). 
In terms of facilitating emotion recognition development, the use of exaggerated 
emotions and emotion labels may not be equally facilitative for all emotions, however. 
Results from the present study indicated that the fear recognition ability of the children with 
Down syndrome - which was at chance level - did not improve under either of these 
conditions. This might suggest that approaches need to be individually tailored more closely 
to specific emotion and developmental stage in order to be effective.  
In contrast to our earlier work (e.g. Williams et al., 2005; Wishart et al., 2007), the 
present study found that emotion recognition ability amongst children with Down syndrome 
was significantly correlated with broader aspects of cognitive and language development, 
such as performance mental age, verbal mental age, and vocabulary comprehension ability. 
The present finding suggests that emotion recognition ability does not necessarily unfold in 
isolation from other development domains. It is therefore important to consider whether 
strengthening domain general aspects of development, such as language and cognition, might 
also enhance emotion recognition  skills (Rosenqvist, Lahti-Nuuttila, Laasonen, & Korkman, 
2014, see also Happe & Frith, 2014). Supporting more general language development is a 
common intervention goal for children with Down syndrome (Fidler, Philofsky, & Hepburn, 
2007), but might also provide some concomitant support for emotion recognition. Support of 
other core cognitive skills, such as verbal short-term memory, working memory, and visual 
selective attention, all known to be areas of difficulty for those with Down syndrome (e.g. 
Breckenridge, Braddick, Anker, Woodhouse & Atkinson, 2013; Brock & Jarrold, 2005; 
Cornish, Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith, 2007; Costanzo et al., 2013), and also linked to emotion 
recognition (Buitelaaer, van der Wees, Swaab-Barnveld & van der Gaag, 1999; Matthersul et 
al., 2009; Rosenqvist et al., 2014), might also be beneficial. Given the role of one’s own 
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emotional experiences, and that of close family members, on emotion recognition abilities 
(e.g. Kujawa et al., 2014; Loi, Vaidya & Paradiso, 2013; Whittington & Holland, 2011), 
taking into account the broader environmental context of the child may also be informative. 
In all participant groups, general language measures (VMA and vocabulary 
comprehension) were correlated with emotion recognition ability, but the production of 
emotion labels was not. In contrast, Herba et al. (2008) found that typically developing 
children’s labelling ability was significantly correlated with emotion recognition accuracy. 
However, their task involved defining emotion labels and label-to-emotion matching, rather 
than label production, as in our study. In the present study there is a complex pattern of 
relationships between emotion recognition and language: our finding that the use of emotion 
labels improved recognition accuracy, along with the correlations between the tasks and the 
language measures, supports the view that, language in general and emotion words more 
specifically, play a key role in emotion recognition (Barrett et al. 2007). Yet the lack of 
correlation between children’s ability to recognize emotions and to label them emphasizes 
again that emotional understanding is not a unidimensional aspect of development (Widen, 
Pochedly, & Russell, 2015). 
When considering the findings from this study, some inherent limitations need to be 
taken into account. As with so many studies in this field, sample size was relatively small and 
the age range of the Down syndrome and non-specific intellectual disability groups was quite 
broad. However, all three participant groups were closely matched, and relatively 
homogeneous, in terms of developmental ability. It also has to be noted that the use of video 
analysis to measure response speeds may have been somewhat less accurate than if the trials 
had been presented via touchscreen computer. However, our previous work with these 
participant groups has found that children at this developmental level sometimes touch a 
number of photographs before settling on their final answer, making the use of touchscreens 
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potentially problematic. In addition our study employed archetypal black and white static 
images of facial expressions as stimuli. Clearly, in everyday life, as well as being dynamic 
and in context, emotions can often be more subtle and ambiguous (Barrett, Lindquist & 
Gendron, 2007). It is acknowledged that the use of static images in the present study limits its 
ecological validity, but it did have the advantage of reducing the memory load for the 
participating children. The stimuli also had high proven inter-rater reliability and included 
precisely-measured exaggerated emotions. Further work to explore the ability of children 
with Down syndrome to recognize fearful expressions using more naturalistic stimuli is 
nevertheless clearly desirable. The recent findings of Channell et al. (2014) are informative 
here in suggesting that emotion recognition may present as less of a difficulty in tasks using 
colour and dynamic stimuli, and also in highlighting the need for research into the use of 
emotion knowledge in ‘real time’ social interactions. Use of more recent threshold 
approaches to measuring emotion discrimination (e.g. Rodger, Vizioli, Ouyang & Caldara, 
2015) would also be helpful in providing a finer-grained understanding of emotion 
recognition in Down syndrome, though the suitability of such lengthy tasks for participants 
with intellectual disability has yet to be established. 
In future studies it might also be helpful to explore fear recognition in Down syndrome 
across a wider age range. In typically developing adults there is a slight, but significant, 
decrease in the ability to recognize fearful expressions with age (Calder et al., 2003). The 
neurological changes associated with dementia have been found early in life in Down 
syndrome (for overviews see Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2016; Zigman & Lott, 2007), but it 
would be premature to associate such changes at a neurological level with a difficulty in fear 
recognition at a behavioral level in children and young adults: searching for developmental 
explanations of recognition difficulties drawing on environmental and/or neurological 
correlates of Down syndrome itself might be more appropriate. Few studies to date 
EMOTION RECOGNITION AND DOWN SYNDROME  
 27 
encompass both adults and children and with only a few notable exceptions, such as Kasari et 
al. (2001) and Pochon and Declercq (2013, 2014), little work in this field has been 
longitudinal. It seems likely therefore that research across a wider age-span, with 
accompanying profiles on more global aspects of developmental and neurological 
functioning, could be helpful in furthering our understanding of how face processing and 
emotion recognition develop with age in Down syndrome, pinpointing strengths and 
weaknesses and better informing intervention strategies where appropriate. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of mental age-matched groups  
 Group (N = 21 per group)    
 Down syndrome   Non-specific intellectual 
disability  
 Typically developing  ANOVA 
values 
 
Variable Mean  (SD) Range  Mean (SD) Range  Mean (SD) Range  F (2, 60) p value 
CA  14.76  (25.3)  10.92 – 18.75  13.35  (35.3)  9.08 – 17.42  4.51  (9.4) 3.33 – 5.75  141.72 .000*** 
MA  4.27  (6.1) 3.75 – 5.75  4.56  (9.8) 3.08 – 5.92  4.68 (7.4) 3.58 – 5.50  2.15 .125 
PMA 4.48 (7.0) 3.25 – 5.75  4.67 (10.2) 3.17 – 6.25  4.98 (9.04) 3.92 – 6.50  2.44 .096 
VMA 4.07 (7.2) 3.42 – 5.75  4.48  (11.2) 3.00 – 6.00  4.41 (8.32) 3.00 – 5.75  1.74 .185 
Vocabulary  
  comprehension 
 
5.26  
 
(21.3) 
 
2.75 – 8.00 
  
5.83  
 
(19.7) 
 
2.83 – 8.17 
  
5.42  
 
(18.5) 
 
2.00 – 7.58 
  
0.66 
 
.523 
Benton Facial 
Recognition Test 
 
14.0  
 
(2.7)  
 
9 - 19 
  
16.1  
 
(3.3)  
 
11 - 22 
  
13.7 
 
(2.0) 
 
11-17 
  
4.74 
 
.012* 
N male/female 8/13  9/12  12/9   2(2) = 1.66  
 
* p < .05; *** p < 0.001 
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Note: 
 
With the exception of the Benton Facial Recognition Test all test scores are reported as age equivalents in years and SDs in months. 
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Table 2 
Emotion-matching task accuracy scores 
 
 
Trials 
 Group (N = 21 per group) 
Down syndrome   Non-specific 
intellectual disability  
 Typically 
developing  
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
veridical emotion   16.86 (4.17)  15.10 (5.00)  18.43 (4.31) 
exaggerated emotion   17.48 (3.70)  15.81 (5.88)  19.43 (3.70) 
non-labelled emotion  15.81 (4.47)  15.10 (5.20)  17.52 (4.85) 
labelled emotion  18.52 (3.75)  15.81 (6.17)  20.33 (3.99) 
Total score†  34.33 (7.59)  30.90a (10.70)  37.86a (7.84) 
 
a significant difference across groups, p < .05 
† Total scores are not the sum of the four conditions, because the four conditions were not 
separately presented. Rather, the emotion presented in each trial was either veridical or 
exaggerated and either labelled or non-labelled. 
Note:  
Maximum score = 24 for each condition and 48 for total score. Score achievable by chance alone 
= 8 for each condition and 16 for total score. 
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 Table 3 
Emotion-matching task average response times (seconds) – all trials (correct and 
incorrect) 
 
 
 
Trials 
 Group (N = 20 per group†) 
Down syndrome   Non-specific 
intellectual disability  
 Typically 
developing  
Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
veridical emotion   2.93 (0.92)  3.18 (2.02)  3.95 (2.00) 
exaggerated emotion   2.59 (0.78)  2.78 (1.82)  3.45 (1.68) 
non-labelled emotion  2.69 (1.18)  3.05 (2.14)  3.50 (1.56) 
labelled emotion  2.83 (0.81)  2.91 (1.99)  3.90 (2.64) 
Mean (SD) response time  2.76 (0.83)  2.98 (1.90)  3.70 (1.82) 
 
 
† Response times for three participants (one from each group) were omitted from analysis, as 
they were > 3SDs above the group mean. Groups did not differ significantly on mental age or 
vocabulary comprehension levels once these participants had been removed. 
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Table 4 
Total accuracy scores for individual emotions (conditions collapsed)  
 Group (N = 21 per group) 
 Down syndrome   Non-specific 
intellectual 
disability  
 Typically 
developing  
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
 Happiness  7.29  (1.06)  6.38  (1.80)  7.24  (1.18) 
 Sadness  6.43  (1.69)  5.67  (2.69)  6.24  (1.67) 
 Anger 3.67  (2.33)  2.76a (1.97)  5.14a  (2.56) 
 Surprise 6.62  (1.53)  6.00  (2.15)  6.67  (1.65) 
 Fear 3.71b  (2.31)  4.52  (2.34)  5.62b  (1.88) 
 Disgust 6.62  (1.69)  5.57  (2.42)  6.95  (1.63) 
 
a significant non-specific intellectual disability-typically developing group difference in anger recognition, 
p < .01;  
 b significant Down syndrome-typically developing group difference in fear recognition, p < .05 
Note: Maximum possible score = 8; score achievable by chance = 2.67. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between emotion-matching score and assessment measures, and pre-task 
emotion label production  
  Emotion-matching task score 
  Group (N = 21 per group) 
Variable  Down syndrome  Non-specific 
intellectual disability 
 Typically developing 
CA  0.11  -0.36  0.47* 
MA  0.54*  0.78**  0.53* 
PMA  0.46*  0.75**  0.41 
VMA  0.45*  0.67**  0.46* 
Benton  0.44*  0.73**  0.17 
Vocabulary  
   comprehension 
 0.75**  0.60**  0.64** 
Emotion label    
   production 
 0.38  0.42  0.24 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
